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ABSTRACT
The adoption of the United Nations (UN) Charter in 1945 marked the legal-
ization of international human rights. Despite the legalized status of
human rights, their violation by states is not uncommon. This article ques-
tions why a state might violate international human rights. Analyzing this
issue from an economic perspective, this article advances regulatory arbi-
trage theory to rationalize a state’s violation of human rights. It discusses
regulatory arbitrage-type behaviors among state actors that derogate from
the obligations to respect, protect, and fulfill human rights. Defending
state sovereignty, minimizing regulatory or compliance costs, and prioritiz-
ing economic achievement are identified as rational arbitrage actions that
circumvent international human rights. We call for competent and credible
governance mechanisms that can increase the cost of arbitrage, to disin-
centivize state violation of international human rights.
Good governance encompasses full respect for human rights and the rule of law (UN Office of
the High Commissioner for Human Rights [OHCHR] 2016). The adoption of the UN Charter in
1945 marked the legalization of international human rights, which govern the relationship
between the state and the individual. It is commonly believed that “all states are bound to respect
internationally recognized human rights” whether or not they have ratified the relevant treaties
on human rights (De Schutter 2012: 39). This view is legally supported through the exercises of
customary international law, jus cogens norms (universally applicable norms with no derogation
permitted), and general principles of law (Chinkin 2014).
However, violation is not uncommon, despite the legalized status of international human
rights (Berween 1999; Schwarz 2004; Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 2007; Cole 2012; Tapsell 2013;
Davies 2014). The deterioration of human rights in Malaysia, for example, made international
headlines when a motion for a resolution to the European Parliament (2015) urged the Malaysian
authorities to repeal the state’s Sedition Act and to bring all legislation (e.g., Prevention of
Terrorism Act [2015], the Printing Presses and Publications Act, the Communications and
Multimedia Act, the Peaceful Assembly Act, and other relevant provisions of the Penal Code) in
line with international standards on freedom of expression and assembly and the protection of
human rights.
Violation of human rights inspires an intriguing basic question: Why do states violate this
international law? There can be a number of reasons; this article focuses on the economic ration-
ale for violation by assuming that some states are likely driven by self-interested economic
motives.1 If a state is driven by economic motives, then its participation in regulatory arbitrage
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is not impossible. Based on this assumption, this article explores the possibility of regulatory arbi-
trage-type actions of a state that violates human rights, which has not been documented in prior
studies on human rights law.
Previous studies (Koh 1999, 2004; Lepard, Koh, Teson, and Charlesworth 2003) introduced a
transnational legal process (i.e., interaction, interpretation, and internalization) to explain the pro-
cess of a state’s observance of international human rights. However, the process might take for-
ever to complete, while arbitrage by the state during the transnational legal process is not
impossible and may result in significant or permanent losses on the part of human rights victims.
Compliance with international human rights law is also argued as a coincidence of a state’s inter-
est in law provisions, rather than norm internalization per se (Gauri 2011). Although economic
self-interest is recognized as a reason for compliance (Koh 1999), it is not normally advanced as
a reason for violation of the law. We enrich the existing literature by exploring the thesis that
a violation of human rights yields benefits that are consistent with the interests of incumbent
state actors.
Taking an economic perspective, we assume some states are driven by economic actors who
are likely to pursue regulatory arbitrage. Regulatory arbitrageurs would take advantage of ineffi-
ciencies or limitations of laws to avoid or minimize compliance costs while maximizing economic
gains (Schammo 2008; Fleischer 2010). This is a plausible assumption for some states that are
more often than not influenced by economically driven interests, as shown in many studies (Koh
1999; Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 2005; Monshipouri, Welch, and Egoavil 2011).
Our assumption can be applicable to economically driven states. This includes, but is not lim-
ited to, authoritarian states that privilege economic growth over political freedoms in their devel-
opmental paths, as acknowledged in many studies (Manan 1999; Monshipouri et al. 2011).
Studies found that states in this category have the weakest incentives of any regime type to join
human rights institutions that impose high sovereignty costs on member states (Hafner-Burton
and Tsutsui 2005). It was also suggested in the literature that “carrots” in terms of trade benefits
or other kinds of economic incentives have to be offered to encourage an undemocratic or dicta-
torial regime to obey international human rights norms (Koh 1999: 1407).
If protecting human rights is viewed as costly and limiting the economic progress of the states
(and state actors), then the controversial nature of international human rights law, such as debat-
able universal legitimacy (von Bernstorff 2008; Mayerfeld 2009; Chan 2013; Tasioulas 2013), dif-
fering interpretations of provisions (Chinkin 2014; Megret 2014), delayed intervention or
selective international intervention (Habibi 2007; Walling 2015), and negligible reputational cost
of violation (Lebovic and Voeten 2009; Wintour 2015), are likely to be exploited by states that
violate human rights in pursuit of economic gains. Ineffective enforcement of international
human rights policies and regulations means that the cost of regulatory arbitrage is negligible,
which provides conditions that breed arbitrage actions among those economically driven states.
Building upon the assumption just described, regulatory arbitrage theory is advanced to
explain why states violate international human rights. We further asked: How does a state behave
during the probable regulatory arbitrage period that involves violation of international human
rights law? To answer this question, three arbitrage actions are identified as consistent with the
thesis on states’ regulatory arbitrage. The arbitrage actions are (1) defending state sovereignty, (2)
minimizing human rights compliance costs, and (3) prioritizing economic achievement that often
coincides with alleged violation of human rights. These plausible actions are explored in the con-
text of Malaysia as an exemplary case, coupled with empirical evidence from previous studies, to
reinforce the arbitrage thesis introduced in this article.
This article proceeds as follows. The second section provides an overview of the sources of
international law that set a legal basis for a state’s international obligations to respect, protect,
and fulfill human rights. This section also advances regulatory arbitrage theory and introduces
the state as a plausible regulatory arbitrageur that is more likely driven by self-interested
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economic motives than international concern for human rights. The third section introduces
Malaysia’s economic and human rights conditions, as an exemplary case. The fourth section
unpacks some plausible arbitrage-type actions. In particular, this section shows how domestic val-
ues can be exploited to claim absolute sovereignty as a shield against violation of international
human rights. This section also examines the inclination to minimize regulatory or compliance
costs and maximize dominant state actors’ economic gains during what is described as an arbi-
trage period that allegedly involves human rights violations. The fifth section concludes with
some reflections and implications in relation to the rationality of states’ arbitrage in the context
of international human rights.
Human rights, state’s obligations, and regulatory arbitrage
This section provides an overview of international human rights law and the ensuing obliga-
tions of the states. Despite legal prohibitions, human rights violations are common.
Regulatory arbitrage theory is then advanced to rationalize violations from an economic
perspective.
Authoritative sources of international human rights law
“International human rights law is a specialist regime within general public international law”
(Chinkin 2014: 75). The authoritative sources are formally set out in Article 38(1), Statute of the
International Court of Justice (ICJ: United Nations 1946). The ICJ affirms two components of
customary international law: (1) an extensive and virtually uniform and consistent state practice,
and (2) the belief that the practice is required by law (opinio juris) (Chinkin 2014).
The ICJ Statute is annexed to and forms an integral part of the UN Charter (United Nations
1945), which has established an international framework for the protection of international
human rights. The UN Charter refers to human rights as a purpose to be achieved by the UN
and its member states. The preamble to the UN Charter states that “the Peoples of the United
Nations determined to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of
the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small,” and
Article 55(c) of the UN Charter states that the UN shall promote “universal respect for, and
observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex,
language, or religion.”
The internationally recognized human rights are made explicit in the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (UDHR: United Nations General Assembly 1948), which clarifies the meaning of
the UN Charter’s provisions on human rights and fundamental freedoms (De Schutter 2012). It
governs the relationship between the state and the individual, and protection of basic human
rights (Cassese 2005).
The UDHR provides a basis for human rights instruments subsequently adopted by the UN,
and may be the only applicable international human rights instrument for many states that have
not signed and/or ratified human rights covenants or treaties (Smith 2012). It is frequently
referred to in international, regional, and national human rights instruments and jurisprudence
and as a point of reference for constitutional questions and constitutive documents, especially in
decolonized or emerging states (Smith 2012). For example, the Malaysian Federal Constitution’s
Article 10 on “freedom of speech, assembly and association”2 is indeed consistent with Articles
19 and 20 of the UDHR. The legal basis of human rights was reinforced by Malaysian Parliament
when the Human Rights Commission of Malaysia Act 1999 was introduced (Jayasooria 2019).
States are also bound by jus cogens norms whether or not they have expressly consented to
them (Cassese 2005; Chinkin 2014). The application of jus cogens norms (such as the right of
peoples to self-determination and prohibitions against torture, racial discrimination, genocide,
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slavery, and slave trade) overrules the legitimacy of national legislative, administrative, or judicial
acts against the norms (Cassese 2005; De Schutter 2012; Chinkin 2014). In theory, “a treaty found
to be in violation of a jus cogens norm is void and must be considered to have never existed” (De
Schutter 2012, 48). Therefore, derogation from jus cogens norms is unlikely to be permitted from
a legal perspective.
A state’s legal obligations
Apparently, respecting internationally recognized human rights is deemed an obligation for all
states, regardless of whether they have ratified the relevant human rights treaties (De Schutter
2012; Chinkin 2014). From a legal perspective, a state is a duty-bearer responsible for human
rights holders.
The legitimacy of human rights is strengthened by the UN International Law Commission
(ILC) consideration of human rights in the development of its Articles on State Responsibility,
which are deemed to represent customary international law (McCorquodale 2009). Consistent
with Articles 4 and 5 of the ILC (UN ILC 2001), a state is defined here as any state organ that
includes any person or entity who has that status or is empowered by the state to exercise ele-
ments of governmental authority. This definition clearly includes state actors.
Article 12 of the ILC specifies that a state breaches its international obligation if it fails to act
in conformity with such obligation. Article 56 of the UN Charter affirms states’ broad obligation,
whereby all UN member states “pledge themselves to take joint and separate action” in cooper-
ation with the UN to achieve the purposes set forth in Article 55 of the UN Charter, which
include promoting “universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental free-
doms for all.”
In terms of implementation, international human rights law is commonly interpreted as
requiring positive and negative obligations of a state (Sepulveda 2003). UN treaty bodies have
adopted a tripartite typology (Megret 2014) that requires a state to respect, protect, and fulfill
international human rights immediately and progressively in discharging its broad obligations
(see, e.g., the Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
[1998]). This implies that a state’s undue delay in implementing its human rights duties is against
the spirit of the law.
The state as regulatory arbitrageur
Despite the obligations legally imposed on states to respect, protect, and fulfill human rights in
an immediate and progressive manner, human rights violations are widespread. This article takes
an economic perspective in questioning why states violate international human rights. We suggest
economic motives for such violation.3 The economic reasons are plausible if the state is assumed
to be motivated by economic self-interest; international human rights law imposes compliance
costs (Cole 2005; Hafner-Burton, Mansfield, and Pevehouse 2015) or can impair economic agen-
das (Monshipouri et al. 2011), and reputational costs of noncompliance are economically negli-
gible (Lebovic and Voten 2009).
If a state is driven rationally by economic motives, then it is not impossible for it to participate
in regulatory arbitrage as the outcome of its calculative actions (or inactions). The theory of regu-
latory arbitrage refers to the behaviors of economic actors who engage in planned or engineered
techniques “to reduce or avoid regulatory costs” but “undermine the rule of law” (Fleischer 2010:
227). Therefore, “regulatory arbitrage drives value creation” (Fleischer 2010: 242) or “can have
beneficial effects” (Schammo 2008: 352). In brief, regulatory arbitrage may involve undermining
the rule of law to maximize economic outcomes.
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Previous studies use regulatory arbitrage theory to describe deliberate practices of nonstate
economic actors (e.g., profit-making firms and tax planners) who “seek to take advantage of regu-
latory differences between jurisdictions in order to reduce costs or to gain an advantage”
(Schammo 2008: 353). Studies commonly suggest that regulatory arbitrage is used “to avoid taxes,
accounting rules, securities disclosure, and other regulatory costs” (Fleischer 2010: 229). This art-
icle suggests regulatory arbitrage is also applicable to avoid or minimize costs associated with
human rights obligations.
Different from previous studies that examine the regulatory arbitrage behaviors of nonstate
actors, this article explores the possibility of state actors implicating a state in regulatory arbitrage.
Regulatory arbitrage is defined in this article as the calculative actions of a state (or state actors)
that undermine international human rights law in favor of economic benefits. Arbitrage activity
by nature should be known only to the arbitrageurs, because publicizing it will trigger external
intervention that would limit or eliminate arbitrage opportunities. Sourcing hard evidence that
can definitively suggest arbitrage behavior is, therefore, fraught with practical difficulties.
Nevertheless, the account of a state’s behavior can be a useful source of inference. If we
assume the state is driven by economic motives, then its actions (or inactions) that violate human
rights are more likely to be the consequence of an arbitrage-related calculative exercise than of a
position of indifference. Similarly, a violation of human rights resulting from a lack of law
enforcement can thus be viewed as a consequence of the state’s calculative exercise (i.e., cost–be-
nefit comparison), given that the violation in this case may hardly result in material reputational
cost to the state. Being economically driven, a state can also be expected to be more likely to take
advantage of institutional inefficiencies, such as limitations of the laws, in the pursuit of economic
motives.
Therefore, regulatory arbitrage in relation to human rights law is plausible because of negli-
gible reputational costs due to inherent limitations of international human rights, such as debat-
able universal legitimacy (von Bernstorff 2008; Mayerfeld 2009; Chan 2013; Tasioulas 2013),
differing interpretations of the provisions (Chinkin 2014; Megret 2014), and selective or substan-
tial delay in international intervention (Habibi 2007; Walling 2015), as acknowledged in many
prior studies.4 If the reputational cost of human rights violation is economically negligible
(Lebovic and Voeten 2009; Wintour 2015), this would encourage arbitrage practices.5 Inefficiency
in the legal system may provide regulatory arbitrage opportunities that can only disappear over
the long term when the law is enforced efficiently, which would then increase the cost of arbi-
trage. Although a state’s economic benefits resulting from its violence during the arbitrage period
could be temporary, pending effective remedial action, losses and damage experienced by the vic-
tims of that violence are irreversible. Arbitrary detention, for example, can seriously diminish the
dignity of victims (Mitchell and McCormick 1988), affecting their employment and future income
prospects.
Because the consequences of the prescribed arbitrage are so profound, this article uses a case
study to explore the issue. We further question: How does a state behave during a probable regu-
latory arbitrage period that involves violation of human rights? Our thesis suggests that a state
arbitrageur would seek to defend its sovereignty, minimize compliance costs imposed by human
rights law, and prioritize economic achievement during what we describe as a regulatory arbitrage
period that violates human rights. In this article, the possibility of rational arbitrage is explored
through Malaysia’s past experience as an exemplary case.
Malaysia: Institutional background
Although Malaysia has not ratified the principal covenants (i.e., ICCPR or ICESCR; UNHRC
2013)6, an Aide Memoire affirms a voluntary commitment to uphold “the protection and promo-
tion of all human rights as an indispensable aspect in the process of nation building,” and
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guarantees an “individual’s fundamental rights and liberties” consistent with the spirit of the
UDHR (UN Secretariat 2006: para. 2). This affirmation of the state’s practice is a credible source
of customary law, with which Malaysia has an obligation to comply. In addition, Malaysia’s con-
stitutional recognition of “fundamental liberties” (Articles 5 and 10, Part II, Federal Constitution)
is likely influenced by Articles 3, 19, and 20 of the UDHR.
Malaysia is chosen as an exemplary case because human rights issues within the jurisdiction
have been well documented, but are far from resolved.7 Regulatory arbitrage is explored as a
plausible factor since Malaysia had enjoyed unprecedented economic growth during the life of
the longest serving ruling party that had entrenched itself in the nation for a period of more than
50 years, which coincided with alleged systemic erosion of human rights (Lent 1979; Manan
1999; Human Rights Watch [HRW] 2015, Thomas 2016)8. Malaysia’s gross domestic product
(GDP) growth was in the region of 8 percent per annum in the decade before the 1997–1998
Asian financial crisis (Jomo 2001). Post crisis, Malaysia still experienced solid growth rates, aver-
aging 5.5 percent per year during the 2000–2008 period (The World Bank 2015).
Many studies have suggested that those politically connected to the ruling elites were able to
gain the lion’s share of the economic growth, while the rights of the general public to speak up
against cronyism, misallocation of public resources, and corruption were frequently violated
(Jomo 1989; Manan 1999; Johnson and Mitton 2003; Gul 2006; Case 2008; Tapsell 2013). In one
of recent cases, more than USD $3 billion was allegedly misappropriated from a Malaysian sover-
eign wealth fund by its high-level officials and their associates (US Department of Justice 2016).
In addition, over e600 million was discovered in the country’s former prime minister’s private
account without any justification of source or purpose (European Parliament 2015). Media outlets
and publishers faced restrictions under the Printing Presses and Publications Act following their
reporting of these allegations, and a local lawyer and a politician were arrested following their
investigations into the allegations (European Parliament 2015).
Members of the public at large, especially those opposed to the ruling party of those days, had
lost their freedom of speech and expression for many years with allegedly abusive applications of
the pre-independence Sedition Act of 1948 and the Internal Security Act (ISA), which permitted
arbitrary detention (Lent 1979; UNHRC 2011; Pak 2014; Thomas 2016). “The main thrust of
criticism by these opposition elements has centred on alleged abuses of political power, especially
growing corruption and increasing limitations of political rights and freedoms” (Jomo 1989: 50).
Although the ISA was repealed in 2013, repressive domestic laws of the same nature (e.g., the
Sedition Act of 1948, the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2015, and the National Security Council
Act 2016) are in place that have continuously depressed Malaysians’ civil and political rights
(HRW 2015). It became indeed an international concern that “the space for public debate and
free speech in Malaysia is rapidly narrowing as the government resorts to vaguely worded crim-
inal laws to silence its critics and quell public discontent and peaceful expression, including
debates on matters of public interest” (European Parliament 2015: 4). For example, it was
reported that around 100 people opposing or criticizing the government were arrested or charged
under the Sedition Act during 2015 (European Parliament 2015).
During what was described as the authoritarian regime in Malaysia (Rodan 2009; Tapsell
2013), international scrutiny was evidenced despite the loss of opportunities experienced by the
opposition to pursue a truly democratic state, and by academics to creatively take part in the
transformation of their society (Manan 1999).9 The previous inspection visits by UN rapporteurs,
the recommendations received by Malaysia during the Universal Periodic Review (UPR), and the
resolution to the European Parliament on the situation in Malaysia had generated a gradual
impact at best. It was reported through the UPR (UNHRC 2013) that Malaysia did not adhere to
periodic reporting deadlines to treaty bodies (i.e., CEDAW, CRC, and CRPD)10 and had pending
requests for visits by Special Procedures. The UPR also reported that Malaysia had responded to
only 4 out of 22 communications sent to it (UNHRC 2013).
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Noncompliance, nonresponse, and apparent delay in the process of ratifying core inter-
national human rights treaties (i.e., ICCPR, ICESCR, CAT, and ICERD)11 as noted in the UPR
are plausible outcomes of a calculative exercise that may fit the definition of arbitrage as pre-
scribed in this article. Not ratifying the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR), for example, is unlikely to be a random outcome, given Malaysia’s poor history in pro-
tecting civil and political rights. Interestingly, Malaysia’s criminalization of freedom of speech
and expression in the past (HRW 2015) often worked in favor of the economic interests of dom-
inant state actors who were allegedly implicated in corrupt enrichment (Mohamad 2016).
Not ratifying ICCPR while allegedly criminalizing freedom of speech and expression during
the period in question might have been driven by calculative exercises that, intentionally or unin-
tentionally, sacrificed human rights in favor of economic benefits for the state. This proposition
is consistent with two arbitrage criteria: (1) undermining the rule of law (Fleischer 2010), and (2)
having beneficial effects (Schammo 2008). The fourth section provides a further account of plaus-
ible arbitrage behaviors.
State regulatory arbitrage behaviors
Capitalizing on sovereignty
The controversial nature of international human rights casts doubt on the legitimacy, ability, and
capacity to deter violation of human rights (von Bernstorff 2008; Mayerfeld 2009; Chan 2013;
Tasioulas 2013). If a state is driven by a rational arbitrage strategy, then low compliance can be
expected when laws have limitations that can be capitalized on to disguise crimes against humanity.
One such limitation is differing interpretations of the status of state sovereignty and human rights
(Men 2011), which can be exploited by state arbitrageurs who fail to prioritize human rights.
It is noted that “state sovereignty and human rights are two fundamental values in inter-
national relations” that are conventionally viewed as conflicting values (Men 2011: 535). Because
sovereign status is valued as an important source of credibility, a state arbitrageur is likely to
capitalize on the concept of absolute state sovereignty as a shield against international concern
about human rights violations under its regimes (Men 2011; Pisano 2014; Divakaran 2015). This
behavior is mostly applicable to authoritarian regimes that value state sovereignty more than
people’s sovereignty. In such cases, a scholastic interpretation such as “humanized state sover-
eignty” (Peters 2009) tends to be regarded as a concept foreign to the local norm, particularly in
some parts of Asia, where states advocate absolute sovereignty more explicitly (Men 2011;
Pisano 2014). Such states’ behaviors are feared, undermining their people’s fight for greater
human rights.
We argue that a state arbitrageur would rationally prioritize its sovereignty over human rights.
Legitimizing absolute sovereignty by citing national norms or values can be seen as a plausible
strategy. The emancipation of national values may be interpreted as consistent with Article 2(1)
of the declaration on minorities (UN General Assembly 1992), which says that “persons belonging
to national or ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities (hereinafter referred to as persons belong-
ing to minorities) have the right to enjoy their own culture.” The line of argument here is that
the reference to “national minorities” in the article may be taken to protect diversity within the
world, in which a nation is deemed as a group of minorities that has the right to enjoy their own
culture (i.e., national values). This line of interpretation is, however, debatable.
That said, it is not impossible for a state to emancipate national values to shield crimes against
humanity. Citing domestic cultural values is indeed a convenient strategy, given the controversial
nature of universal values, which is a limitation of international human rights. This is because
“determining the content of customary international law is strewn with practical and theoretical
difficulties” (Chinkin 2014: 82). It remains controversial whether the emergence of peremptory
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norms (jus cogens), which are vaguely defined, could be regional, rather than universal, as certain
values may be central to only a group of states of a particular region (De Schutter 2012). Human
rights law is indeed argued by some to be “an instrument employed by Western powers to dom-
inate and exploit non-Western societies” (Cassese 2005; Tasioulas 2013: 24). Consequently, if
there are economic reasons to derogate from international norms, what are supposed to be uni-
versally accepted human rights may be abandoned by some economically motivated non-
Western states.
The exceptionalism movement of the Associations of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) sets
an exemplary case in which domestic values were perhaps exploited to advance state sovereignty
as a primary principle. Absolute sovereignty and noninterference principles are trademarks of
the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration (AHRD), which was formally launched in 2013 (Pisano
2014). The roots of this axiological exceptionalism can be traced to the “Asian values” debate,
which was launched at the end of the 1980s by two Prime Ministers during the time, Singapore’s
Lee Kuan Yew and Malaysia’s Mahathir Mohammed (Pisano 2014). Leveraging Confucian and
Malay values was integral to formalizing the discourse of “Asian values” that inherit a top-down
authoritarian model (Mohamad 1970; Reid 1995; Manan 1999).
Asian values are commonly defined in the literature as giving more weight to economic devel-
opment and economic or social rights than to civil and political rights (Lent 1979; Men 2011;
Pisano 2014). Restricting people’s civil and political rights was claimed to be consistent with the
practices of Malaysia’s ruling elites during the state’s authoritarian regime (Lent 1979). This was
made possible through a legitimate channel such as the Sedition Act of 1948, which prohibits any
act, speech, or publication that demonstrates contempt against the government, as specified in
Section 3 of the act. The authoritarian practice can be traced back to the traditional Malay culture
that was based on feudalism and restricted individual liberty (Mohamad 1970). Proponents have
claimed that “there was no explicit concept of human rights in Malay culture” (Manan 1999:
364). Human rights are thus seen by some in Malaysia as reflective of Western values (Manan
1999; Pisano 2014).
Malay society was traditionally divided into rulers and their chiefs, who enjoyed absolute rights
and privileges, and a lower class of people, made up of peasants, slaves, and debt servants
(Manan 1999). Abuse of power and violation of human rights by Malay rulers and their chiefs
were common during the precolonial era (Manan 1999). British colonialism pre 1957 did not
seem to detach the Malay rulers’ commitment to absolute sovereignty, while the post-colonial
Constitution retains that sovereignty.
Although Article 10 (1) of the Federal Constitution guarantees the right to freedom of speech
and expression, the right to assemble peaceably and without arms, and the right to form associa-
tions, these rights are not absolute. The rights are limited by Section 4 (1) of the Sedition Act of
1948 (see, e.g., Public Prosecutor v. Azmi bin Sharom [2015]).12 The rights are also curtailed in
Sections 2 and 3 of Article 10 itself, which specify that parliament may by law impose restrictions
as it deems necessary (see, e.g., Madhavan Nair & Anor v. Public Prosecutor [1975]).13 Until May
2018, there was no hope when two-thirds of the parliament was dominated by the same ruling
coalition in most years. Such a condition rendered the parliament subservient to the executive
body, passing laws that enhanced the executive’s sovereignty (Manan 1999). The same ruling
coalition entrenched itself as a dominant actor of the state for more than half a century. Robust
sovereignty enjoyed by the state under its longest serving premier (1981–2003) was perhaps a key
force behind the movement to formalize absolute sovereignty as reflective of Asian values.
While dominant state actors continually enjoyed sovereignty, the independence of judicial
bodies was often questioned during what is described as a regulatory arbitrage period that was
perhaps masterminded over many years in Malaysia (Lent 1979; Manan 1999). During such
a period, dominant state actors have intervened in what was supposed to be an independent
investigation of alleged corruption involving a government-linked company and a key state actor
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(European Parliament 2015; Sherwell 2015; Mohamad 2016). Media outlets, publishing houses,
and journalists had faced pressure, in the form of harassment or litigation, which discouraged
them from reporting about the alleged corruption (HRW 2005; European Parliament 2015). The
mainstream press was controlled and dominated by a ruling coalition that had ruled Malaysia for
more than 50 years since independence (Lent 1979; Manan 1999; Tapsell 2013).
On many occasions, the judiciary was described as facing great challenges to safeguard peo-
ple’s fundamental rights and freedoms. It was a difficult position for many when confronted
with the might of the executive body or ruling elites in the absence of absolute protection by the
Constitution, coupled with the draconian domestic laws that restricted human rights and funda-
mental freedoms (Manan 1999; Ali 2001; Thomas 2016). The nation was paralyzed when both
the parliament and judiciary did not do enough every time key state actors capitalized on state
sovereignty to protect economic interests at the expense of people’s rights to freedom of speech
and expression. If the resulting human rights violations were constitutionally rooted, and had
curtailed freedoms during more than half a century, it can be argued that violence was not a
random outcome, but rather the outcome of the entrenched ruling elites’ calculated exercises.
Sovereignty was taken as a credible defense in this strategy.
During such a regime, when Malaysia’s Foreign Affairs Ministry was asked about the
European Resolution (2015) on human rights violations in Malaysia, the response was: “The
Government of Malaysia strongly believes that full respect must be provided to any sovereign
country to decide on its internal affairs” (Divakaran 2015). If this response represents the arbi-
trage strategy that exploited sovereignty to shield violation of human rights, and if the new
regime takes the same stance, the concept of humanitized sovereignty (e.g., Peters 2009) will
have a long way to go before it can gain practical weight and universal respect in Malaysia.
Absolute sovereignty and noninterference principles were upheld in Malaysia, which was con-
sistent with the practice of ASEAN countries where human rights violations are common
(Davies 2014; Pisano 2014). One may also argue that the emergence of Asian values or the
exceptionalism movement was an arbitrage strategy to “legalize” the “campaign to diminish
human rights” and “an excuse for authoritarianism and other abuses of government” in favor
of economic achievement (Manan 1999: 359).
Minimizing regulatory or compliance costs
It is rational for an arbitrageur to avoid compliance with international human rights law if they
perceive compliance as imposing unnecessary costs. Regulatory costs can manifest in the form of
impingements on absolute sovereignty caused by international inspections or reporting, required
resources to serve human rights, and resultant political instability that could restrain economic
growth (Lent 1979; Mitchell and McCormick 1988; Cole 2005; von Bernstorff 2008; Gauri 2011;
Monshipouri et al. 2011; Hafner-Burton et al. 2015).
While peremptory norms as a source of customary law remain vaguely credible in framing
state violence (Chinkin 2014), violation of human rights treaties that the state has ratified can be
more definitively determined due to the presence of these treaties. Because law sourced from
treaty ratification can be more credibly enforced, it is likely to impose greater regulatory costs
on a state. Even so, treaty ratification based on the state’s consent is another key limitation of
international human rights, because rational state arbitrageurs are more likely to opt for nonrati-
fication to avoid regulatory costs altogether. This is because a state would perceive that its sover-
eignty could be impinged upon by treaty members pressing for international inspections or by
reporting requirements, which are viewed as unnecessary costs to take on board.
Hafner-Burton et al. (2015) attempt to quantify sovereignty cost and examine how this cost
influences states’ decisions to ratify human rights treaties.14 Based on 36 treaties, they find
no empirical evidence to suggest that autocratic states were willing to incur sovereignty costs.
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This finding implies that autocratic states tend to neglect ratification of very costly treaties in
order to minimize sovereignty costs associated with consenting to treaty-based human
rights law.
Alternatively, a state might ratify only weakly enforced treaties that minimize sovereignty cost
if there is a symbolic benefit to be gained from such ratification. Based on data gathered from
more than 130 countries between 1966 and 1999, Cole (2005) finds that ratification of a human
rights treaty for a state with a poor human rights record is very likely as long as enforcement of
the treaty remains relatively weak. It seems that formal consent without proper legal enforcement
“could become a smokescreen for further violations” (von Bernstorff 2008: 909). A weakly
enforced treaty is thus not that costly to member states, and does not prevent the state’s viola-
tions of the law itself.
It was also reported that only 98 of 146 countries acceding to ICCPR between 1966 and 1999
did so without reservations (Cole 2005). Reservations are another limitation of treaty-based
human rights law. Reservations are less likely if treaty enforcement is relatively weak. Indeed,
“governments often took a selective approach to which binding commitments they would take
on” (von Bernstorff 2008: 915). The state’s “cherry-picking” strategy in treaty ratification could
be considered another arbitrage strategy plausibly adopted to minimize regulatory or compli-
ance costs.
However, it is important to note that a nonratification of human rights treaties does not neces-
sarily exempt states from their human rights duties enunciated in the UDHR. Nonratification
only helps states avoid additional surveillance or regulatory costs imposed by the treaties (i.e.,
impingement on sovereignty due to periodic inspections, and reporting deadlines to treaty
bodies). For example, ratifying the Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture and
Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (OPCAT) is viewed as imposing
higher regulatory costs on a state as compared to ratifying the Convention on the Elimination of
all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), because the former establishes a system
of regular visits by independent international and national bodies to investigate allegations of tor-
ture in member states (Hafner-Burton et al. 2015). Therefore, it is rational for Malaysia to delay
the ratification of OPCAT but not CEDAW, which was ratified in 1995. The state’s delay in
acceding to OPCAT (UNHRC 2011, 2013) is a plausible regulatory arbitrage strategy that con-
dones arbitrary detention while avoiding a definitive liability associated with such action.
Minimizing spending for human rights’ causes is another plausible rationale for state violation.
“In reality, of course, complying with a human rights treaty requires economic and organizational
resources,” but the literature on human rights compliance usually relies on a “simplifying
assumption that treaty compliance is costless for governments” (Gauri 2011: 36). Real-life cases
demonstrate that ratification of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), for example,
appeared to increase immunization rates only for high-income countries. Based on 1989–2007
data, Gauri (2011: 55) finds that “although immunization is itself not an expensive public health
intervention … building a primary health care delivery system, setting up and maintaining
appropriate incentives, and monitoring performance require substantial bureaucratic capacity.”
Although Malaysia subscribes to Asian values that are commonly defined as giving more
weight to economic development and economic or social rights than to civil and political rights
(Lent 1979; Men 2011; Pisano 2014), the state has hardly made a concrete move to ratify the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) (UNHRC 2014). This
could be part of a rational arbitrage strategy to avoid definitive costly implications associated
with its actions or omissions related to the treatment of migrant workers, were Malaysia to
become a party to that treaty. Given that migrant workers account for nearly one-third of the
country’s workforce (UNHRC 2014), ratifying and complying with the ICESCR would require
additional spending by the state to fulfill the treaty’s provisions, such as to ensure the enjoyment
of just and favorable conditions of work (Article 7), adequate living standards (including
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food, clothing, housing, and continuous improvement of living conditions) (Article 11), and the
enjoyment “of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health” (Article 12) for
migrants. Not ratifying the ICESCR may be viewed as a rational arbitrage strategy to avoid com-
pliance costs, as the state left 15,000 Filipino children at risk of statelessness and denied them
access to government schools and basic amenities (UNHRC 2013: 6).
If human rights and civil liberties are considered luxuries (Lent 1979; Manan 1999), a poor or
even developing state would allocate resources more to matters related to economic development,
whereas a rational state actor would prioritize spending to serve vested interests. For Malaysia
during its allegedly violent regime, nonratification of the ICCPR had successfully served to min-
imize costs for years, which might have benefited the entrenched ruling elites. There was little
economic rationale to formally consent to such a treaty, if doing so was seen as impinging on
the sovereignty of the economically driven ruling elites and causing reallocation of resources to
projects on freedom of expression, which runs counter to the ruling elites’ interests.
A Malaysian Prime Minister once remarked, “Too much freedom is dangerous” (Reid 1995:
C02; Manan 1999: 362). Malaysia’s disregard of civil and political rights can also be evidenced by
its reservation of Article 14 of the CRC, which obliges state parties “to respect the right of the
child to freedom of thought, conscience and religion.” Peaceful expression among adults was
criminalized for fear of destabilizing a political system, which, it was believed, could put state
security at risk (HRW 2015). If security is at risk, then the state will have to cut its expenditure
on economic development to meet increased expenditure on defence (Singh 2004). Although this
argument promotes the idea that complying with international human rights is expensive, one
can also view it as an arbitrage strategy to legitimize state violation of human rights.
Prioritizing economic achievement
Many studies have suggested that Malaysia’s development has privileged economic growth over
political freedom (Jomo 1989; Manan 1999). The state’s violation of people’s political rights and
freedoms had given way to both uninterrupted economic growth and corruption during what
was described as a long regulatory arbitrage period. Such a period witnessed “obvious abuses of
political power, especially growing corruption and increasing limitations of political rights and
freedoms” (Jomo 1989: 50). The use of violence to counter opposition (Bohara, Mitchell, Nepal,
and Raheem 2008) was often criticized for creating political stability in favor of corrupt enrich-
ment of ruling elites. Violating human rights in this way is indeed a concern in the
International Council on Human Rights Policy (ICHRP 2009: v): “Political actors have abused
their entrusted powers to focus on gains for the few at great cost for the many.”
Political stability was regarded as important to protect the economic interests of international
investors too. For this reason, it was suggested that “the greater the economic association with
the United States or other advanced capitalist countries, the greater the degree of human rights
violations” (Mitchell and McCormick 1988: 479). In Malaysia, the average net inflows of foreign
direct investment (FDI) during 1981–2014 were about 4 percent of the country’s GDP (The
World Bank 2016). The United States contributed the most new FDI in 2013 (US Department of
State 2014). While political stability was important to serve the economic interests of inter-
national capitalists, there was often a greater need to safeguard the interests of leading state
actors, who were frequently accused of enriching themselves through corruption since the institu-
tion of the New Economic Policy (NEP) in 1970.15
The alleged corrupt enrichment by the “nascent Malay bourgeoisie” in Malaysia was long high-
lighted by Jomo (1989: 42), well before his appointment as the UN Assistant Secretary-General
for Economic Development in 2005:
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The growing role of the state, especially since the NEP, has increased opportunities for various types of
corruption. The phenomenon of money politics, for example, reflects the convergence of political and
economic power, especially among the leadership of the major component parties of the ruling… coalition.
It is now widely believed that most new opportunities for wealth accumulation are crucially determined by
political access, rather than entrepreneurial. (Jomo 1989: 38)
Corruption and cronyism in Malaysia are acknowledged by many studies (Manan 1999;
Johnson and Mitton 2003; Gul 2006; Case 2008; Tapsell 2013). Empirical evidence suggests that
during the 1997–1998 financial crisis, firms with strong ties to the prime minister at the time eco-
nomically benefited from the cronyism-favoring capital controls he instituted. The resultant bene-
fit experienced by favored firms accounted for roughly 32 percent of the estimated $5 billion gain
in market value during September 1998 (Johnson and Mitton 2003). His deputy was fired in a
way that was allegedly against human rights (Ali 2001). The deputy spoke out against the prime
minister and was arrested for weakly substantiated allegations, and continued to struggle with
unfair trials until he was finally pardoned in May 2018 (Tapsell 2013; European Parliament 2015;
Ellis-Petersen 2018).
During the arbitrage period in question, there were also allegations involving another key state
actor, who allegedly secured highly lucrative government contracts for an oil and gas company
owned by his son and allowed his son-in-law to become involved with and benefit economically
from dealings of several investment companies linked to the government (Gatsiounis 2007; Case
2008). The enrichment of a family business empire in this way (if any) remains uncontested due
to a lack of transparency and public disclosure that can deter definitive legal actions, whereby
people were constantly threatened by domestic laws that do not adequately protect political rights
and freedoms.
Transparency and accountability can be impaired by frequent or abusive use of power and the
Official Secrets Act (OSA) (1972) (HRW 2015). This act gives the government the right to classify
as a state secret any document it deems to be sensitive to national security. Prior to May 2018,
opposition politicians claimed that “the government has used the OSA in many instances to avoid
scrutiny, including for deals it strikes without tender with politically connected private
companies” (Gatsiounis 2007: 2; Lim 2018). While peaceful expressions of key political opposi-
tions were criminalized, media reporting on alleged corruption involving ruling elites was always
blocked (Lent 1979; Tapsell 2013; HRW 2015). Two Deputy Prime Ministers were ousted in 1998
and 2015, respectively, to silence their expressions against alleged corruptions involving key state
actors. Fear of economic disruption was constantly used to justify violations of human rights dur-
ing the period in question (Singh 2004).
Reinforcing a culture of fear, especially among ethnic Malays, who are already threatened by
the economic superiority of ethnic Chinese, can be viewed as a rational arbitrage strategy of the
longest serving ruling party in amplifying its status as the “protector” of Malays since 1957 until
their historic defeat on 9 May 2018. This arguably genuine act of protection had conveniently
served the economic interests and hegemony of connected elites, though it might have also
involved condoning corruption at the expense of human rights. Such arbitrage actors will return
to enjoy the arbitrage benefit if ethnic Malays continue to prioritize sovereignty blindly and
believe in the unwarranted fear of Chinese economic power (Singh 2004).
Conclusion
From the perspective of international human rights law, all states are bound to respect, protect,
and fulfill internationally recognized human rights in an immediate and progressive manner.
However, violations of human rights are not uncommon. There are several factors that may
contribute to human rights violations and regulatory arbitrage is one of them. As a matter of
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discourse, we explore the rationale of state violence from an economic perspective by using
regulatory arbitrage theory.
To our knowledge, this is the first article to offer insights from regulatory arbitrage theory to
explain human rights violation. This theory is used to explore the possibility of a state deriving
economic benefit from its violence. Regulatory arbitrage refers to the behaviors of state actors,
which may involve calculated actions (or inactions) to reduce or avoid regulatory costs, which
tend to undermine international human rights in favor of economic interests. Plausible arbitrage
behaviors were explored through an exemplary case of Malaysia and empirical evidence from
human rights literature.
This article argues that leveraging local values to mount absolute sovereignty of the state
against alleged violation of human rights can be viewed as a rational arbitrage strategy that was
driven by pressing economic interests. This strategy coincided with economic growth to the
benefit of ruling state actors as in Malaysia’s past experience. The resultant violence on oppo-
nents was criticized by many as systemic with help from draconian domestic laws (HRW 2015;
Ali 2001; Thomas 2016), seen as the outcome of calculated actions (or inactions) over more
than half a century.
The status of international human rights was taken as controversial during such an arbitrage
period. There were limitations such as a lack of universal legitimacy, differing interpretations of pro-
visions, substantial delay or selective international intervention, and negligible reputational cost of
violation. In addition, the Human Rights Commission of Malaysia Act 1999 and an official human
rights watchdog, Suruhanjaya Hak Asasi Malaysia (SUHAKAM), were not necessarily regarded as
effective instruments to limit arbitrage behaviors that violate human rights (Rodan 2009).16
During the period in question, it was perhaps ambitious for Malaysia to live up to its volun-
tary pledge and commitment to uphold the promotion and protection of all human rights. A for-
mal declaration of human rights was criticized as a window-dressing act of little practical value
(Manan 1999), or a “hypertrophy” or “textual fac¸ade” that “acts as a form of political manipula-
tion to disguise a lack of commitment to implement them” (von Bernstorff 2008: 909). From an
economic perspective, a formal declaration on human rights in this spirit can be seen as a
rational regulatory arbitrage strategy that preserved and/or maximized the economic interests and
hegemony of entrenched elites. One may argue that Malaysia would not have achieved its eco-
nomic status as an “Asian Tiger” (Pisano 2014) and “authoritarian” (Rodan 2009; Tapsell 2013)
had it spent the maximum available resources on respecting, protecting, and fulfilling human
rights obligations.
If Malaysia’s past performance is judged based on the spirit of the UDHR (1948), violation of
human rights (if any) would pose doubt about whether it has achieved the “common standard of
achievement” that has been universally agreed upon “for all peoples and all nations.” If the
UDHR or other treaties are valued as genuinely respectable governing standards, Malaysia should
have invested in human rights projects unconditionally, even at the cost of slowing down its eco-
nomic progress. Also, if the European Parliament (2015) resolution about the situation in
Malaysia is an effective instrument, then there is a hope for the future state of Malaysia. The
alleged misappropriation of the nation’s wealth by previous high-level officials and their associ-
ates, as reported by the US Department of Justice (2016), is now being dealt with according to
the rule of law. Unfortunately, repressive domestic laws such as the Sedition Act of 1948 have
not been repealed, and four persons have been allegedly detained under the act recently (Mering
2019). Ratification of ICERD was also refused of late (Pillai 2019).
To conclude, the controversiality of international human rights gives way to the state’s regula-
tory arbitrage. If arbitrage should disappear with increased transaction costs or regulatory effi-
ciency and effectiveness, we would advocate the imperative of competent and credible regulation
and governance mechanisms to increase the transaction costs of arbitrage and disincentivizing
human rights violation. If an outright international intervention is not a suitable form of
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governance due to state-centric international level of order (Donnelly 2014), then an impactful
and timely international scrutiny is imperative when a state fails to honor the rights of a weak
nation. Delayed intervention would simply prolong the failing state’s arbitrage period, increasing
the loss and damage experienced by powerless victims of violence.
Therefore, robust international politics of human rights are needed to support domestic
human rights advocates and impede backsliding (Donnelly 2014). In a practical sense, the merits
of acceding to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court should not be downplayed
in order to protect people from the most serious crimes of concern to the international commu-
nity as a whole (Lim 2019). Further, the installation of the World Court of Human Rights should
be supported and expedited, as this will allow rights holders or victims to seek remedy and legally
binding judgments from a court that is independent of the state or duty bearer (Novak 2011).
In addition, providing support for “independent” domestic human rights advocates is crucial
to enhance their effectiveness in educating and empowering people as competent governance
agents to monitor and report states’ violent behaviors. Domestic awareness and activism will
make regulatory arbitrage costly as the ruling actors will be constantly pressured (“regulated” or
monitored) to fulfill human rights obligations. Therefore, we advocate for people’s power to dis-
courage states’ regulatory arbitrage.
Strengthening people’s power is feasible and was indeed evident in the unprecedented outcome
of the 2018 Malaysian general election, when an allegedly violent long-standing government lost
its power to rule the people. Such progress can be advanced further by introducing human rights
as a mainstream element of curriculum at schools, with its fundamental principles embedded in
all students’ activities. This will enlighten members of the future generation about their funda-
mental liberties as enshrined in the Constitution, and human rights as the common standard of
achievement for all peoples and all nations.
Notes
1. This assumption is commonly adopted in the literature; see, e.g., Koh (1999), Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui
(2005), and Monshipouri, Welch, and Egoavil (2011).
2. The Constitution was first introduced as the Constitution of the Federation of Malaya (1957), and
subsequently introduced as the Constitution of Malaysia (1963).
3. There are certainly noneconomic motives for violation that are beyond the scope of the present discussion.
4. The limitations of international human rights law are well recognized and have been discussed in prior
studies. For the sake of brevity, this article is not intended to recapitulate discussions on this topic.
5. Human rights abusers were not really penalized by other states. Bilateral aid received by countries with
poor human rights records was not affected by “shaming” through the UN’s resolution (Lebovic and
Voeten 2009). China has also secured £30 billion worth of bilateral trade with Britain despite its allegedly
poor human rights record (Wintour 2015).
6. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).
7. Deterioration or violation of human rights in Malaysia was reported by nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs) (HRW 2015), Special Rapporteurs (UNHRC 2011), Universal Periodic Review (UPR) 2013, and
the resolution to the European Parliament (2015). For the sake of brevity, this article does not revisit all
of the cases. At the time of writing, Malaysia has been experiencing a transition since a change in
government in May 2018.
8. The longest serving party was finally defeated on 9 May 2018. There is hope for human rights in
Malaysia if the Coalition of Hope does not pursue regulatory arbitrage that undermines human rights.
9. In Public Prosecutor v. Azmi bin Sharom (2015), an academic was prosecuted for a criminal offense under
the Sedition Act of 1948 for his academic opinion on a political issue. Further details are available at:
https://www.cljlaw.com/ekehakiman/pdf/press_summary_pp_v_azmi_sharom.pdf [19 February 2016].
10. Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), Convention
on the Rights of the Child (CRC), and Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD).
11. Optional Protocol to the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment (OPCAT), and International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (ICERD).
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12. See note 9.
13. Madhavan Nair & Anor v. Public Prosecutor [1975] 2 MLJ 264. Available: http://cijmalaysia.org/
miniportal/2010/09/article-10-of-the-federal-constitution [19 February 2016]
14. Some of the features of human rights instruments deemed to increase sovereignty costs are formal
reporting, extensive coverage, annual and ad-hoc meetings on human rights issues and related issues,
cooperation with NGOs, built-in enforcement mechanisms (e.g., removal of violent states, rules of courts
or similar bodies), and democracy as membership criteria.
15. The NEP was introduced to alleviate poverty and eliminate the identification of ethnic Chinese with
economic functions (Jomo 1989).
16. According to Rodan (1999), widespread skepticism about SUHAKAM’s independence, resources, and
investigative powers came shortly after its establishment. It was reported that concerns were raised by a
coalition of 31 human rights NGOs, opposition parties, and the Malaysian Bar. SUHAKAM’s financial
problem has also emerged recently (Loheswar 2019).
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